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1  Introduction
The Münchhausen trilemma and the diallelus present a formidable obstacle to the possibility to know.  In
chapter 2 we  look  into  the  question  whether  infinite  or  circular  reasoning  can  provide  information.
Chapter 3 is about the kind of information we might have access to, and theories of truth.  Chapter 4
investigates the cases of transcendent exceptionalism and transcendent mediocrity, and concludes that
only in the latter case knowledge of the external world is possible.
Chapter 2 contains a bit of probability calculus.  Those who don’t need to be reminded of the poignancy of
the sceptical argument can skip it.
2  Grounding knowledge
The Münchhausen trilemma states that any piece of knowledge requires support of at least one of the
following kinds:
1. Foundational –  support  that  itself  requires  no  further  support  (or  support  that  is  equal  to  the
knowledge itself, depending on one’s position on the nature of support).
2. Infinitary – an endless and non-repeating chain (or directed acyclic graph) of grounds, each providing
support for the knowledge above it2.
3. Circular – a graph that contains cycles, such that the transitive closure of the grounding relation in in
some cases reflexive.
In practice it is useful to make a more fine-grained distinction; we shall do so in separate subsections.
2.1  Immediate foundational support
In the simplest case, the fact under consideration is already part of our starting knowledge.  In chapter 3
below we shall look into the question what that starting knowledge might consist of.
2.2  Finite foundational support
In  the  case  of  foundational  support,  there is  a  body of  information  already  known to  us,  and finite
reasoning allows us to close that body transitively with respect to implication.  Of course the amount of
information we already know could be infinite, or the information itself could be about infinite structures –
such  as  knowledge  how  to  compute  limit  values.   The  reasoning  graph  itself  will  be  finitely  deep,
however3, and end in information that is certain (though, again, it may be about uncertainty, such as the
information that a fair coin has a probability of ½ of landing heads).
2.3  Potentially infinitary support
Infinite chains where an infinite number of nodes also have foundational support may be run down finitely
deep to collect the information in a finite subset of the nodes.  This can be compared to the following
situation.
Imagine  an  infinite  row  of  painters  on  an  infinite  plain,  working  on  a  huge,  intricate  painting of  a
1 E-mail: truth@b.biep.org; orcid: 0000-0003-2582-4973; web site: https://biep.org.
2 It may be useful to stress that this is about doxastics, not the mere fact that the number of propositions may be
infinite.  Infinite systems of propositions that contain a finite amount of information may be solvable with finite
work.  For instance, the infinite system {ai=2
− i
+ai +1}. can be solved for any i∈ℕ in finite time.
3 Given that we are finite beings, it will be finitely broad as well.  Here we are only concerned with the depth – the
length of the reasoning chain –, however.
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perspective – a river running to the horizon.  Each painter paints one kilometre of that river, and then
passes on the painting to the next painter in the row.  Even though I shall never be able to see the whole
painting,   walking arbitrarily  far along the row of painters  enables me to see any  foreground of the
painting apart from the horizon itself.  In practice, there will be a hard limit, determined by my finiteness.
Achievable information is information I can actually reach, given the circumstances I am in.
In such situations each step adds part of the picture, and depending on the nature of the sequence, in the
limit the whole picture may or may not be reached.  It is this limit that can be approached asymptotically.
Of the special case where this foundational support “along the way” is about probabilities, Atkinson and
Peijnenburg (2017) have made a thorough analysis.  In that case there is a statement that may be true or
false, and at each level part of the probability spectrum is “painted in”, i.e. each node i is of the form: “of
the remaining part  of  the probability  spectrum, for  some fraction  τi the statement  is  true;  for  some
fraction ϕ i the statement is false, and for the remaining ρi≜ τ i−ϕ i the next node in the chain will provide
the  information”.   So  at  each  level,  an  amount  of  probability  is  added,  and  in  the  limit  the  exact





ρi = 0 (what they call  “the usual
class”)4.
The image there would  be each successive painter  i painting a  horizontal  strip  τi of  plains  and  the
corresponding strip ϕ i of sky, thus more and more constraining the possible position of the horizon on the
canvas.
Now Atkinson and Peijnenburg do not make a terminological distinction between three cases:
1. The foundational support found on each level is known in advance.  In this case instead of going down
the chain, the problem can be recast in a finite form – computing the limit of a known series.  This is
their original Barbara example.
2. The foundational support cannot be known in advance, but is met along the way.  That is the true
potentially infinitary support that concerns this section.
3. Each bit of support needs support again – there is no foundational information on any node.  They
exclude that situation in some remarks5, though – it falls outside the scope of their analysis.  We shall
call that actually infinitary support, and it is the subject of the next section.
Atkinson and Peijnenburg give an example, where the probability a bacterium (Barbara) has some trait
depends on both a known base probability of having mutated (the foundational knowledge), and whether
her ancestor had it (the regredient knowledge).  So each node in the main chain has two ancestors, one
part of the chain (“the parent has this probability of having the trait”), and the other a leaf node with the
mutation information (“this bacterium has probability ϕ of losing the trait if it inherited it, and probability τ
of  gaining  the  trait  if  it  didn’t  inherit  it,  and  probability  ρ of  inheriting  whether  it  has  it”),  and
correspondingly it has both foundational support and inherited support – but only the foundational support
does have any influence. 
Now because in their example we are supposed already to know the probabilities for each bacterium, and
the total of that knowledge is finite, the situation is actually foundational, and the outcome can be fully
calculated in finite time6.  If we replace the pre-known information about all generations by information
that must be collected in some way individually for each generation, all that remains possible is the “walk
down the row of  painters”,  and we have the potentially  infinitary  support  with  which  this  section  is
concerned.
2.4  Virtually infinitary support
We are finite beings, and information that takes too long to reach might as well be infinitely far away, so
in practice we may not be able to gather all the information at finite depths.  In that case there is a
“timber line”, information below which for the sake of the analysis can be considered “at infinity”.  With




ρi is the amount of influence node n has on the outcome, and this goes to zero in the limit, they speak
of “fading foundations”, i.e. the relevance for the outcome of the foundational knowledge found in deeper parts of
the chain goes to zero as the subchain under consideration starts farther and farther away from the root.  A slightly
more mathematical version of this argument is given in the appendix, section 5 below.
5 They make this clear in e.g. their sections 4.4 and 6.4: “we are not trying to formulate an answer to the sceptic”.
6 This is comparable to the situation where there wasn’t a river, but a straight railroad in the plains.  Part of the
painting, plus the knowledge that the railroad was straight, would allow one to find by extrapolation the point
where the painted rails will meet at the horizon.
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2.5  Actually infinitary support
Here no (sufficient amount of) foundational support can be reached at any finite depth.  One possibility for
that is what Atkinson and Peijnenburg call the “exceptional class” (into which we shall look deeper in
section 2.6 below) – but there is a more fundamental case.
Let us consider a variant of the Barbara example.  Here we investigate the bacterium Barbara celarent,
and the research question and situation are as above, except that we have no foundational support of the
mutation  rates  –  those  rates  are  supported  by  research,  and  the  research  is  supported  by  general
knowledge about how to set  up experiments and how to interpret the results,  and those in turn are
supported by probability theory, which is supported by the law of great numbers, which is supported by
experiments with flipping coins, which are … and so on, literally  ad infinitum.  And of course the claim
that we did the research – that we didn’t just dream we did, or have a false memory – needs undergirding
too, and so do the claims that the bacterium we tested was indeed B. celarent, that the experimental set-
up was correct, that the lab journals weren’t tampered with between the research and the computations,
that the underlying model was sufficiently correct, that the scientific method yields truth, that …
In the B. celarent example there is no way to establish any prior probability, and as before all information
from infinity tends to have zero relevance.  The conjunctive nodes at  any point  make this the more
poignant – though infinite disjunctions (alternative ways to support the conclusion) might counteract that.
The  reductio argument states that if one fact can be proven from such a groundless graph, then any
statement  can –  including the negation  of  that  fact.   So,  infinite  chains  cannot  take us  beyond the
transitive closure under  inference of  the knowledge we start  with.   No knowledge can emerge from
infinity.
2.6  The exceptional class and circular support
The same objection holds in the case of circular support.  We can “roll out” the cycles, and reduce the
cyclic graph to an infinitely-deep non-cyclic one, and apply the above reasoning.  As the S values end up
repeating, the product will vanish except in the degenerate case where they are 1, the exceptional class.
But what about that exceptional class?  This contains cases of (asymptotic approximations of) infinite
entailment rather than probabilistic reasoning.  These cases are like pronomies – sentences that have
more than one fixed point.  Take the self-affirmation: “This sentence is true”.  It can validly be true, and
validly be false, and no inference can wrest out the information which of the two it really is.  A non-circular
version (say, the sequence of “Foo is bar” followed by infinitely many copies of “The previous sentence is
true”) is no different in that respect – the sequence as a whole gives us no information about whether foo
is or is not bar.
Suppose the trait  is  the ability  to  defend itself  against  a  poison in its  environment.   Through some
mechanism (let’s say gen deduplication), offspring tends to be better at defending itself.  If the probability
to survive an antibiotical treatment is  p, then pi−1 = pi⋅(1+rnd (1−pi)).  Now if some bacterium with an
infinite pedigree is given us, no amount of reasoning can help us decide whether it will or will not survive
the antibiotics – all we know is that its probability to survive it will be either 0 or 1, depending on whether
the infinitely-far first ancestor had none or some of the trait.
Now circular support is more restricted than repetitious support, because it enforces identity not only of
the formula, but also of  its value.  An endless list of  “The previous sentence is false” is a pronomy,
whereas a sentence pointing to itself that way is an antinomy.  In this case the endless list is like a two-
step cycle.  Sometimes, circularity can turn a pronomy into a system with a single solution.
In the probabilistic case, as long as a regression in the exceptional class forces  some restriction on the
possible probability of the starting proposition (i.e. we are not dealing with pure entailment), an endless
repetition of the infinite regression would fall in the normal class. Atkinson and Peijnenburg analyse this in
their chapter 8.
Having  a  unique fixed  point  doesn’t  make that  outcome correct,  however.   Loops  are  cases  of  self-
reference, and we don’t know yet how to deal properly with self-reference.  Treating it in the way we treat
non-self-referential propositions leads to errors.  If that weren’t so, the proposition “If this statement is
true, then God exists” would be a sound argument for the existence of God.  We shall return to this in
section 3.1 below.
So in the cases of the exceptional class and circular support as well, there is no information emerging
from the infinite or circular depth.
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2.7  Pragmatically foundational support
If my wife holds up her hand, stating “Here is one hand”, I agree with her.  If George Edward Moore does
the same, I’ll include some unfulfilled supports: “Well, provided I can trust my visual qualia, and all they
seem to imply, then yes.”  In practice, while writing up the B. celarent report we see no need to justify
modus ponens,  give evidence for  the statistical  law of  large numbers,  or  prove the existence of  an
external world.  Belief in those is shared by all our readers (if there is an external world, and it does in fact
contain readers, and …), so we somewhat arbitrarily cut off our support graph there.
Infinitists  seem  to  do  this  –  they  claim  that  support  should  be  given  till  one  reaches  “obvious”
propositions.
There is nothing wrong with that, if the assumed truths have indeed been established – which means that
the world is such that those things can indeed be established, or at least be made probable7.  Chapter 4
below looks into the requirements that places on reality.
3  The foundation
Since we are interested in establishing an upper bound on what can be known, we can grant without
defence that we can know our qualia, including our hopes and fears, and our thoughts, including our
imaginings, for which we shall use the word dream as a technical term.  So an author devising a world
with a plot has a dream, and so does a mathematician who considers the seven-point space.  We can also
know that we know these things8.
The  main  hurdle  for  knowing  is  the  diallelus:  whatever  we  know indirectly,  we  know through  some
channel.  That channel may be a reasoning, or a message bearer (e.g. an optic nerve), or a criterion for
truth, or anything transporting information from a (quite possibly compound) source to us as the receiver.
The diallelus: we can only know X on the basis of what comes to us through channel C from source S, if
we already know the reliability of both S and C.
So if I already know modus ponens as truth yielding9, and I know both p and p→q, then I can know q – but
can knowledge of  modus ponens be part of our foundation?  Can we know that  modus ponens is true?
Obviously we can believe it, and even find ourselves unable to disbelieve or seriously doubt it, but does
that make it true?
<<Add probabilistic version: even a basis for that is problematic, so not even likely truth is achievable.>>
3.1  Coherence
If I were a solipse10, my beliefs would be the only reality out there, and therefore as true as anything can
get.  So the fact that I had a coherent set of beliefs would suffice for knowing.
A related position is the coherence theory of truth, that coherence is all that matters for truth.
This position makes sentences such as “There is a world out there independent from my thoughts” have a
very  different  meaning  from its  apparent  one  –  it  no  longer  is  about  a  world  out  there,  but  about
coherence of that belief with other beliefs, quite independent from whether there is or is not actually a
world out there in the traditional sense11.
A big question is “coherence of what?”  Let B be the whole of one’s beliefs.
• Internal coherence – coherence of  B – is insufficient, even if there is only a single fixed point, as we
saw in section 2.6 above.  Otherwise “If this sentence is true, God exists” would be a valid existence
proof of God, and “If this sentence is true, God does not exist” an equally valid proof of the opposite, –
as long as one believes only one of those, and no other beliefs refute the one believed.
On the other hand, at least internal coherence will be required for truth.
7 There is an amazing light-heartedness regarding scepticism.  For many, a statement such as “Well, if you are going
to  doubt  that,  you  might  as  well  start  doubting  everything!”  seems  to  be  a  sufficient  ground  for  rejecting
scepticism.  Finding the conditions under which knowledge is possible seems a much less-taken road.
8 Arguably, if  I  believe I  have pain, I  have pain,  and if  I  believe I  am imagining a white sphere,  I  am  actually
imagining what I believe is a white sphere.  I do not claim we can know that the thing we imagine is actually a
white sphere, of course – external knowledge is not made true by believing it, or false by disbelieving it.
9 As Lewis Carroll (1895) showed, this is very different from knowing the fact “modus ponens yields truth”.
10 A solipse is a solipsist who is right, or a non-solipsist who is wrong.  The latter position yields interesting paradoxes,
which fall outside the scope of this article, however.
11 But then that sentence would also have another meaning, and the original idea is simply not expressible within the
coherentist framework.
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• Coherence of B∪S, for some S - but what would that S be?  It cannot be some externally-defined set,
lest the truth of “That is S” be not determined by coherence but by correspondence.  We shall see a
satisfactory candidate in section 4.2 below.
• Coherence of a set of beliefs meeting some criterion, such as minimality or simplicity.  One question is:
“why that criterion?”.  Is it true that that is the correct criterion?  Another is that there seems to be no
guarantee that any such criterion will pick out a unique system of beliefs, that not several may be
equally minimal or simple, for example.
The question of determining B itself is hard too.  On pain of inconsistency the coherentist may not refer to
one’s actual beliefs in giving the truth condition for “B is the set of one’s beliefs”.  Likewise the notion of
coherence, and the criterion, stand in need of determination.  If I believe that my beliefs are coherent, i.e.
I believe “it is true that B is coherent”, does that suffice?  Does my belief that B is simple suffice?
3.2  Correspondence
The main contender is the correspondence theory of truth, which states that truth equals correspondence
between belief and reality12.  But insofar our beliefs concern the external world, how can we ever decide
their truth or falsity?  How could we gain access to this outer world, in order to compare it to our beliefs?
One solution would be to restrict our beliefs to our inner world – our qualia, dreams, longings, beliefs, and
so on – and remain agnostic about an external world, but that leaves one with a very limited domain for
truth.
4  Bootstrapping
But the situation is worse, for how can we get at that prior in the first place? 
So the only option for us to know anything is for it to be grounded by a finite, acyclic graph, the leaf nodes
of  which are foundational.   The leaves must be material  that is  already available to our minds,  and
reasoning can then reach a transitive closure of that material under probabilistic reasoning.  But what is
that material?
The answer depends on the way the world is – is  transcendent exceptionalism13 true, or  transcendent
mediocrity? We shall investigate both cases in separate subsections.
4.1  Transcendent exceptionalism
According to transcendent exceptionalism the world is immanent – we may be dreaming other worlds, and
people in it, but no-one is dreaming our world, with us in it.
There is me, at least a bundle of knowledge.  There are qualia, dreams, propositions, and possibly other
elements in that bundle, and it is reasonable to assume that I can have knowledge of those, their nature
and shape.  So those are possible leaf nodes of inference.
Knowing a proposition does not imply knowing its truth value, of course.  I may have strong convictions
that an external world exists, but that doesn’t make it knowledge.  The fact that I have those convictions
may constitute knowledge, though.
I can have knowledge of my dreams, of the laws that hold in them, and of any bit of them – I am the one
dreaming them, after all.  Whether those laws hold in the external world, if there is one, is another matter.
There is no a priori reason why any of my beliefs about an external world are correct – and that includes
beliefs concerning logic and probability theory.
For instance, I might try to reason from repeatable experiments (“if I will to close my eyes I consistently
get the experience of reddish twilight”) to a lawful external world, but that requires induction, and there is
no way to get to induction without using it already.  From “induction worked in the past” to “induction will
probably work again” requires an inductive step.  Induction presupposes order, and there is no way to
discover order14.
Likewise logic: there is no way to infer modus ponens or universal instantiation without applying those –
or applying some rule that in the end will require those for its grounding (Finn 2019).  The fact that logic
12 This is independent of the precise natures of both the truth bearers and of the truth conditions, about which we
shall remain agnostic in this paper.
13 See  my  Transcendent  Mediocrity  is  the  Neutral  Position for  an  explanation  of  the  notions  of  transcendent
exceptionalism and mediocrity, and of the technical sense in which I use dream, dreaming, and so on.
14 This is explained in my The  W  orld’s Haecceity is the Dual of My Thrownness  .
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reasoning feels coherent does not prove anything either – maybe it is the very error-riddenness of our
reasoning that makes us conclude its coherence.
So we seem limited to reasoning about our dream worlds, where we are in control of the facts, including
any logical and physical laws that may hold there.
One interesting conclusion is that if transcendent exceptionalism is true, we have no way of knowing it –
for  all  I  know  I  might  be  a  solipse,  or  part  of  someone’s  dream  world.   Believing  or  stating  that
transcendent exceptionalism holds is a performative contradiction.
4.2  Transcendent mediocrity
Under  transcendent  mediocrity,  the  situation  is  very  different.   Now  we  have  a  transcendent  mind
thinking this world, including us, and including our thoughts.  Let us call this mind  God.  Assuming for
simplicity that God is a solipse15, he knows his dream – our world – and can convey to us the transitive
closure of this knowledge16, and the knowledge that what he conveys to us is reliable.  After all, as the
dreamer of our world, he also dreams the rules holding here.
There are some conditions that come with this, given the nature of our world, but we shall not specify
those here17.  One fact about this world is the existence of evil, which includes disbelief in the truth.  We
can deny facts we know, bringing ourselves to disbelief, or lull ourselves into believing facts we want to
be true.  This is so for facts about the world – say, the gambler convincing herself that she will win next
time and so cover her losses – and for the very knowledge of the existence and nature of God18.
4.2.1  Truth
The truth about our world being precisely what God believes about it, if  S is the whole of God’s beliefs
about our world and B is what we believe about it, then the coherence of B∪S is a correct criterion for the
truth of B, for the correspondence of B with the actual (state of the) world.
What immanently is a correspondence theory of truth, transcendently is a coherence theory: coherence
with the maximal set of beliefs that do correspond with the world – with what God believes.  This does not
meet the requirements of the coherence theory of truth, as it still points to a set of beliefs in a way that
theory doesn’t allow us to.
However, a modified coherence theory might allow access to one’s own beliefs – and since those beliefs
contain  pointers  to  God  and  his  beliefs,  at  the  very  least  the  criterion  can  be  stated coherently.
Evaluating beliefs for truth is a different matter.  From above (i.e. by God) that can be done within the
framework, as my beliefs are coded in his beliefs about my beliefs.  From below (by us) that can be done
precisely to the point that our access through the knowledge a priori allows us.  What is it that God gives
us in that respect? 
4.2.2  Knowledge a priori
This knowledge is immediate – my thoughts are thoughts of the transcendent mind, and are in a way akin
to qualia.  I can know, but I cannot prove that I have pain, or long for a cold drink – not to others, and not
even to myself.  Likewise, I can know that God exists, that modus ponens is true, that there is an external
world, but I cannot prove it.  The very feature that makes such knowledge immune to the diallelus also
prevents  it  from being  grounded by reason.   If  I  stub my toe,  and  have  pain,  all  I  can  hope  for  is
resonance in others – their ability to understand my pain by being sufficiently like me and being willing to
imagine undergoing the same, and to consider the qualia that would go with that.  If someone were flatly
to deny understanding what I was talking about, or being aware of a quale that would fit my attempts to
describe  my pain,  I  have  no  means  to  change  that  –  other  than  pointing  to  others  who  do admit
understanding.
15 If it is not, we shall need a second-order transcendent mind to dream the first-order transcendent mind, and so on,
for the knowledge condition in this section to be fulfilled.  Let the mind in question be the solipse at the root of the
tree described in Transcendent Mediocrity is the Neutral Position.
16 This is one way of putting it, but there is no reason why this would involve an infinite regress.  For the purpose, he
might decide there be such a thing as “self-evident truth”, with all the relevant properties and attributes.  Such are
the joys of being a dreamer (and a solipse at that).
17 See my Fundamentals of Philosophy for a very basic statement of them.
18 This corresponds to the claim made by many theologians and philosophers of religion, that we all know that God
exists, but repress that knowledge.  And that is not only true for atheists, or people believing in false religions, but
for all of us.  At best, some of us allow a modicum of that truth to enlighten their thinking.
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Likewise, I must now switch to a description that I merely hope will resonate with some readers, and may
bring some of the others to a searching introspection.  Maybe the fact that the alternative – having no
foundation for any beliefs beyond self-beliefs – is so unappealing may bring readers to it, and hopefully
some will discover deep down, at the very foundation of their thinking and believing, the things I am
about to describe.
Let me then start by stating that what I find there is not propositional knowledge.  The English language is
unfortunately poor here, but there is body, soul, and mind knowledge (German können, kennen, wissen;
French  pouvoir19, connaître, savoir).  If we appropriate the triad  can, ken, wit for that distinction, then
what I find is not some “witting”, but something encompassing “canning” en “kenning”.
I  may be able  to  speak my mother  tongue grammatically  faultlessly,  while  finding myself  unable  to
formulate correct grammar rules for it.  Yet, if I hear a sentence formed by my or others’ rules that is
ungrammatical, I will know so.  Likewise, I find an ability to reason, which also gives me a familiarity with
reason – and which helps me to recognise the rules of logic as basically correct.
Analogously I find such a can/ken foundation for understanding my sensory qualia, and from these derives
my witting that an external world exists.  All our applications of those foundations are fallible, but in this
case the foundation itself let me also ken the fallibility of sensory perception.
The can/ken foundation for the existence of other minds is even more extreme in this respect: it lets me
ken an extreme potential fallibility – and tends to compensate for that by tentatively attributing mind to
anything to which it might even vaguely apply.
I shall not try to be exhaustive.  Time, order, good and evil, and so on all have their can/ken foundation.
All those foundations also let themselves be known as reliable (within their own limits), and from God.
God himself also has his can/ken foundation – I may be wrong in many ways about God, i.e. my witting
about him may be very wrong, but I ken him and can interact with him.  And in a way that foundation is
the foundation of those foundations too, but again I find that I ken it as such, but find it hard to put that in
wit terms – in communicable, propositional language20.
4.2.3  Fallibility
Our knowledge is fallible, but this does not translate to fallibility of the can/ken foundations.  Only if they
were to present something as infallible whereas in fact it were wrong would that be the case.  But on the
contrary, the foundations make me aware of my fallibility at all times.
If e.g. my reasoning foundation would present my reasoning tools as infallible, I would never come to
know that they weren’t – any contradiction derived would merely drive me to beliefs that everything is
true and false at the same time.  It is only because I already have the knowledge that my reasoning is
potentially wrong that I can recognise when it is actually wrong.
It is precisely because the can/ken foundations present much of their knowledge as fallible that we can
deny unwanted elements of it.  Taking ethical knowledge as an example, we can harden ourselves against
the “voice” of our foundation for morality, and convince ourselves that certain behaviour is not immoral –
and end up truly believing that, on a higher level.  We can “dehumanise” someone, or some group, i.e.
deny a human being.  Dehumanising perceived enemies, or torture victims, are well-known examples.
Likewise we can deny a soul in animals, and torture them – fishing for sport, cooking lobsters alive, and
lots of ancient folk games, many of which have been banned nowadays.
4.2.4  Denial
One can also  deny the existence of,  or  access  too,  the can/ken foundations.   Possibly  some people
actually  don’t have access to some of them – psychopaths to the ethics foundation,  for instance, or
atheists to the God foundation.  This presents no epistemic problem; it simply means that such people
have less knowledge they can use as a foundation.
It does become an epistemic problem if someone on the one hand claims not to have some foundation,
but on the other hand uses knowledge from it as well-founded.  Someone who trusts logic while denying
the  can/ken  foundation  for  reasoning is  making an epistemic  error.   Others  –  who do recognise  the
foundation – may have reason to trust his reasoning, but he himself hasn’t21.
19 Unfortunately,  pouvoir is otherwise overloaded, and one says  « Je sais faire cela » for skills on any of the three
levels.
20 This may be one reason among many others why people tend to share their experience with God partly through
song,  dance,  ritual,  and  other  means  of  communication  that  are  closer  to  canning  and  kenning.   Reducing
knowledge about God to witting would amount to canning God it in the common sense of “canning”.
21 This seems to be where presuppositional apologetics starts.
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5  Appendix
It has become traditional to shirk the responsibility to define “justification”.  We shall follow that tradition,
and accept the approach of Atkinson and Peijnenburg (2017) of only requiring that “A i is grounded in A j”
implies that P(A i∣A j)>P( Ai∣¬A j).  This implies no loss of generality, since if P(A i∣A j)=P( Ai∣¬A j) there is no
support from  A j for  A i, and in the case that  P(A i∣A j)<P( Ai∣¬A j) replacing  A j by  ¬A j will produce the
desired inequality.  So we assume that S i≜P(A i∣A i+1)– P(A i∣¬A i+1) is positive.
In order to see why true infinitary support is impossible, it is useful to distinguish the prior probability P-
and  the  posterior  probability  P+.   P− includes  all  achievable  foundational  information,  that  is  the
maximum information the reasoner is able to collect by going finitely far down the chain.  Then we can
rewrite the Rule of Total Probability so as to separate out the prior probability and the influence Δ≜P+−P−
of the support.  So  P+=P−+Δ, and support is possible if  Δ≠0, i.e. if adducing the support makes any
difference.
Let us assume a linear potentially infinitary support of the kind A0← A1←A2← A3← A4← A5←…, where the
arrow indicates “grounds”.
The Rule of Total Probability then states that
P+( Ai) = P( Ai∣A i+1)⋅P
+
( Ai+1)+P(A i∣¬A i+1)⋅P
+
(¬ Ai+1)
P− (A i) = P( Ai∣A i+1)⋅P
−( Ai+1)+P(A i∣¬Ai+1)⋅P
− (¬A i+ 1)
Now since
P+(A i+1) = P
−
( A i+ 1) + Δi+1
P+(¬Ai+1) = P
−(¬A i+1) − Δi+1
we get
Δ i = P
+
(A i) − P
-
( A i)
= P( A i∣A i+1)⋅P
+( A i+ 1)+P( Ai∣¬A i+1)⋅P
+(¬A i+1) − P
−( Ai)
= P( A i∣A i+1)⋅(P
−
( Ai+1)+Δ i+ 1) + P( A i∣¬A i+1)⋅(P
−
(¬A i+1)−Δ i+1) − P
−
( A i)
= P( A i∣A i+1)⋅P
−
(A i+1) + P (A i∣A i+1)⋅Δ i+1 + P(A i∣¬Ai+1)⋅P
−
(¬A i+ 1) + P( A i∣¬A i+1)⋅(−Δi+1) − P
−
( A i)
= P( A i∣A i+1)⋅Δ i+ 1−P (A i∣¬A i+1)⋅Δ i+1 + P (A i∣Ai+1)⋅P
−
(A i+1)+P (A i∣¬A i+1)⋅P
−
(¬A i+1) − P
−
(A i)
= Si⋅Δ i+1 + P(A i∣A i+ 1)⋅P
−
(A i+1)+P (A i∣¬A i+1)⋅P
−
(¬A i+1) − (P (A i∣A i+1)⋅P
−








For the support to be relevant,  Δ0 must be different from 0, which it only will be in what Atkinson and
Peijnenburg call the exceptional class  – where inference equals or asymptotically approaches entailment,
and which we consider in section 2.6 above. For cases from the usual class Δ0 will be zero, so infinitary
support chains cannot change probabilities away from the prior.  This is what Atkinson and Peijnenburg
call the fading foundation.  And as they remark, it is roughly the opposite of Bayesian washing out – here
it  is  the  evidence (at  infinity)  that washes out,  and the  prior  probability that in the limit  is  the sole
determinant of the posterior probability.
5.1  Virtually infinitary support
If there is a maximum depth we can reach, P− includes precisely the information to be found up to that
maximum depth.  All other information is considered “infinitely far away”, as if we were in the exceptional
class, and the same result as found in section 2.6 above obtains.
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